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THE RIO GRANDE TREATY OF 1933
A PRELUDE TO SETTLEMENT
THOMAS M. ·DAVIES, JR.

THE YEARS 1920-1940 were a tumultuous period in the history
of United States - Mexican relations. Fortunately for both countries, three of the United States' ambassadors to Mexico proved to
be outstanding diplomats. Dwight D. Morrow, -who served from
1927 to 1930, was replaced by Joshua Reuben Clark, Jr., his righthand man; and Josephus Daniels succeeded Clark in 1933, serving
until 1941. Here we are concerned with a speCific aspect of the
term of J. Reuben Clark.
Of all the issues faced by Ambassador Clark, only one, that
pertaining to the Rio Grande boundary and the ownership of the
plot of land known as £1 Chamizal, between £1 Paso, Texas, and
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, did not stem from the Mexican Revolution. On the contrary, the origins of ,this controversy date from
the years preceding Mexican independence. Boundary disputes,
the majority of which concern the Rio Grande, have been prevalent throughout United States-Mexican History.l
As early as 18°4, Thomas Jefferson claimed the Rio Grande
as the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1836, the
first Texas Congress set the Rio Grande as the southwesternboundary of their new nation. In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in
1848 the Rio Grande was designated as the permanent boundary
between the United States and Mexico. To insure the continued
existence of this boundary, the treaty provided for a permanent
Boundary Commission, to be composed of one man from each
nation.
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In 1853 the Gadsden Purchase rectified the boundary in the
Gila River area, and the Boundary Commission sought to take
advantage of this opportunity to delineate an acceptable Rio
Grande boundary. The inherent problem, however, was that the
Rio Grande meandered continually, never retaining a fixed channel. This was particularly true in the area around EI Paso, Texas,
where the soil is sandy and where torrential seasonal rains often
caused the river to shift its bed. Periodic Hoods and resultant
erosion continued throughout the nineteenth century, and the two
nations tried again in 1884 to establish an acceptable line.
The Chamizal dispute dates from 1873 when the ~io Grande
suddenly shifted south of the 1852-1853 channel bed. It first became a matter of international concern in 1894 when the Boundary Commission sought to establish a dividing line on the bridges
between Ciudad Juarez and EI Paso. Mexico protested that no
one had been authorized to establish a boundary between the two
nations, but only to draw a line between the two cities. Mexico
further protested that Pedro I. Garda had filed a claim in which
he alleged that he owned a plot of land called Chamizal which
had been affixed to the United States by a sudden shift in the
.
river bed.
Garda asserted that his grandfather had secured title to the
tract in 1827 and that his family had retained possession until
1873 when the river shifted. Under Article I of the Treaty of
1884, he claimed legal possession, charging that the shift had not
been erosional, but a sudden abandonment of the old bed. 2
In 1897 a serious Hood in the valley prompted the citizens of
EI Paso and Ciudad Juarez to demand action. The two governments agreed to straighten the channel and to share the cost. The
work was completed in 1899, and, as a result, Cordoba Island was
created and given to Mexico. The population of Chamizal had increased during the 1890'S. In 1892. a church and a parochial
school were built, and a second church was built in 1905.3
Two serious diplomatic incidents, one over a railroad right of
way in 19°7 and the other over a disposal plant in 19°9, forced
both governments to act. In 19 I ° they agreed to establish an ad hoc
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mixed arbitration.commission composed of one United States
commissioner, one Mexican commissioner, and one commissioner
to be appointed by the Government of Canada. The convention of
1910 clearly stated that the decision of the commission was to be
final, conclusive; and binding on both nations.
The basic argument of the Mexican Government was that the
shift had been sudden and avulsive; therefore, in accordance with
the Treaty of 1884, the tract must remain under Mexican
sovereignty. The United States, on the other hand, held that the
alteration had been slow and erosive and hence that the area was
no longer legally a part of Mexico. The United States further
claimed the area by right of undisputed possession since 1836.
On June I 5, 1 9 1 I, the commission announced it had awarded
Chamizal to Mexico. The United States commissioner, Anson
Mills, refused to accept the decision and President Taft backed
him up. Thus the United States rejected the decision of an
arbitral commission whose findings it had agreed to honor. Mexico
protested, but the United States remained adamant and the controversy over Chamizal continued unabated.
There were numerous attempts made to settle the boundary
disputes in the period 1912-1927 but none proved fruitful. A new
ingredient had been added to the controversy; the advent of the
Mexican Revolution had sorely disrupted the boundary discussions
and even the arrival of Dwight Morrow failed to break the deadlock. During 1927-193° the crucial question centered upon the
problem of bancos which had been cut away by the shifting river. 4
It was on questions of national territory that the nationalism which
grew out of the Revolution was most evident. Neither nation
would agree to proposals of extensive territorial exchange, not because the proposed exchanges were unjust, but because the diplomatic climate was unfavorable. 5
Some progress was made in 1928 and 1929 which paved the
way for the agreement of 1930. On June 19, 1928, the International Boundary Commission announced that it had unanimously agreed on forty-two decisions regarding exchange of territory arising from changes in the bed of the river. 1i On December
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1928, the Commission released a report recommending the
engineering feasibility of the preliminary plans for the stabilization of the boundary and the rectification of the Rio Grande. 7
In July 1929; the United States lifted its embargo on arms and
munitions to Mexico, and the Mexican Government announced
that all domestic strife had ended. Thus the way was cleared for
closer relations between the two countries. In August of 1929,
the Boundary Commission met again to discuss the banco problem,
which had increased in importance owing to the activities of rumrunners and smugglers along the border. s The prospects of a settlement appeared so bright that Secretary of State Stimson sent
J. Reuben Clark as a special representative of the United States
to assist the American Commissioner Lawrence W. Lawson. 9 The
Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs Genaro Estrada invited the
International Commission to meet in Mexico City to put into
treaty form the plans to rectify the river and stabilize the boundary.lO The State Department approved the meeting and the conference convened on July 28, 1930. When Ambassador Morrow
was not in Mexico, as was often the case during the summer of
1930, the responsibility was delegated either to Clark or to
Lawson. l l
In addition to the easing of diplomatic and border tensions between the two countries, another factor greatly facilitated the work
of the Commission. Citizens from both the United States and
Mexican sides of the river sent committees to their respective governments to lobby for a prompt settlement. 12 The periodic Hoods
in the El Paso-Juarez Valley, particularly the one-half million dollar one in 1925, had prompted demands.Eor immediate action.
The mairi stumbling blocks in the negotiations of early 1930
were the question ofChamizal and the problem of private United
States and Mexican land titles. Clark maintained from the beginning that Chamizal should be discussed along with the rectification
treaty, but his efforts were to prove futile. 13
By July 1930, both countries were ready for what was hoped
would be profitable negotiations. Public pressure remained constant; relations between the two countries were steadily improv21,

Charles Bishop Eddy and Mrs. Eddy

Dave Kemp, first sheriff of Eddy County and part owner
of one of Phenix' largest saloons

Eddy, New Mexico March 25,1890
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ing; and the two governments had tentatively agreed on basic
points. In addition, both Clark and Morrow were urging the State
Department to concentrate all its efforts on the boundary and
claims commissions problems. 14
. On July 28, 1930, just three days after convening, the Commission took a major step forward by approving and signing
Minute 129. This Minute, which was far-reaching in its implications, set forth the final plans for the work of rectification in the
El Paso-Juarez Valley. In essence Minute 129 proposed: to cut
the length of the river between El Paso and Box Canyon from
155 miles to 88 miles by straightening the channel; to construct a
Rood retention dam twenty-two miles below Elephant Butte Dam
on the Rio Grande, creating reservoir storage of one hundred
thousand acre feet; to locate the channel and to estimate the value
of the acres detached from one country and attached to the other
in such a manner as to insure that neither country would gain nor
lose from the exchange of national territory; and to devise a payment plan which would take into account the estimated value of
agricultural investments in the valley and the proportionate benefits to be derived by each country.15
The estimated cost of the project was set at $6,106,500. From
this total certain items which the Commission did not consider to
be proratable, but which were properly chargeable to each government, were subtracted. Among these were rights of way, purchase of private channel rights, and changes in irrigation works.
These items amounted to $ 1,174,200, leaving a proratable total
of $4,932,3°0. The United States agreed to pay $4,34°,424 or
eighty-eight per cent, leaving Mexico with $591,876 or twelve
per cent. 16
The prospective benefits from such a treaty were impressive.
It would eliminate Roods in the El Paso-Juarez Valley, shorten the
boundary from 155 miles to 88 miles, increase the gradient and
velocity of the river to enable silt and sediment to be carried away,
and establish a definite water boundary. It would prevent future
channel changes and provide for better enforcement of the national
law of both countries by fixing the maps of the river. 17

....

~
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Both the State Department and President Hoover approved
the plans, and Stimson instructed Morrow to negotiate a treaty
covering the points in Minute 129. Morrow was further instructed
to include, if possible, a final settlement of the Chamizal area and
any other territorial differences which existed between the two
countries. IS
Although the two governments had tentatively agreed upon
the proposed plans, the final signing of a treaty was delayed for
more than two years. The stumbling block, as in the 1920'S, was
the disposition of Chamizal, Cordoba and Horcon tracts and of
San Elisario Island. Lawson suggested initially that the United
States purchase Cordoba and Chamizal for one million dollars
and also perform all work on both sides of the river. 19 Mexico, on
the other hand, suggested that if Cordoba would revert to the
United States, then by the same principle San Elisario Island
should pass to Mexico. The United States rejected this offer,
however, because the richest agricultural land in the valley was
on San Elisario Island. 20 The need for a settlement can be seen
in the fact that until an agreement about Chamizal was reached,
the United States could not own or control its portion of the Hood
channel.21 Thus Lawson again suggested that the United States
purchase Chamizal for $1,600,000 and C6rdoba for $200,000,
but the offer was Hatly rejected by the Mexican Government. 22
On September 9, 1930, the Mexican Government informed
the Embassy that they had approved the report of the Boundary
Commission together with the engineers' report of river rectification. Mexico proposed that the Commission meet again in Ciudad
Juarez to approve a new minute, and on September 18 Lawson
wrote that the inclusion of Chamizal in the treaty was a definite
possibility.23 He did inform the Department, however, that there
was much in the proposed Mexican minute which was objectionable to the UnitedStates. 24 The negotiations all but stopped in
the next few months, largely owing to the ambassadorial change
from Morrow to Clark.
On January 1, 1931, Clark attempted to reopen negotiations on
the boundary problem. He spoke with Acting Minister of Foreign
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Affairs Schiaffino who stated that he was ready to begin preliminary
discussions, but that the conclusion of any agreement must await
the return of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Estrada. 25 Before
Estrada left for New York in December of 1930, he and Clark
had agreed that the first step should be the settlement of Chamizal,
and Clark informed the Department that he wished to continue
with that plan.26 Clark also urgently requested that the Department try to stop any move in Congress to pass an appropriation
bill for the project until a treaty with Mexico had been signed. 27
On March 25, 193 I, the State Department suggested three
ways that the negotiations might be expedited. First, they saw a
need for a definite date for the transfer of sovereignty of the affected lands. Second, they saw the need for abolishing all right
of protest regarding the area transferred from one country to the
other; and third, they felt that the treatment of existing titles was
awkward because it involved either purchase or condemnation proceedings by both nations. 28 In April, Clark expressed concern over
the fact that United States lands thrown south of the established
border would be worth only a fraction of their previous value
while the Mexican lands thrown north might conceivably treble or
quadruple in value. 29 Clark further stated that an equitable adjustment of the Chamizal question was not only advisable, but
was indispensable to a proper settlement. 30
Negotiations throughout 193 I remained almost at a standstill.
In July Clark persuaded one of his contacts to present a rectificationplan to. President Ortiz Rubio and General Plutarco Elias
Calles. Both men favored the plan, but neither would push for
its adoption. 3 ! It is not possible to document the reasons for their
failure to expedite. the matter, but it should be remembered that
July was the month when the Mexican vice-consul at Chicago,
Adolfo Dominguez, was arrested, and that in June two Mexican
students, relatives of the Mexican President, had been shot to death
by sheriffs in Ardmore, Oklahoma. In short, river rectification
was not an immediate concern of the Mexican Government.
On January 10, 1932, Clark secured an interview with Calles,
brought to his attention the apparent stalling tactics of the Mexican
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Government regarding the river rectification plan, and indicated
that the United States would soon want a categorical answer.
Calles replied that he was no longer giving orders, but that he
would talk with President Ortiz Rubio. 32
In April of 1932, Clark approached the new Mexican Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Manuel C. Tellez, and told him that the United
States desired a quick settlement of the rectification project because
of the imminent danger of Roods. 33 Tellez replied that he did
want to deal with rectification and that he did want to include
Chamizal in the settlement. He offered to cede Chamizal to the
United States in return for a cancellation of the Pious Fund
Award. 34
The Pious. Fund had been established in 1697 by the Spanish
Government for the benefit of Jesuit missionary work in California.
In 1848, the fund totaled several million dollars, and since the
United States claimed the fund· as a part of the acquisition of
California, it became a point of contention between the two
countries. 35 On October 14, 19°2, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague handed down a decision ordering Mexico to
pay the United States $1,420,682.67 in cash and an annual sum
of $43,°5°.99 in perpetuity.36 Mexico paid the lump sum and the
annual installments until 1914 when she suspended payment. It
was this aggregate of unpaid sums, plus six per cent annual interest,
plus the cancellation of future payments that Tellez suggested the
United States exchange for Chamizal. He felt that in this way public opinion in Me?,ico would be satisfied and both nations could
save face in the dispute. 37
Clark agreed to such an arrangement and asked Tellez to draw
up a draft agreement regarding the various points. The Tellez
plan, however, met strong opposition in the M~xican Cabinet itself. Narciso Bassols, the Secretary of Education, and Alberto J.
Pani; the Secretary of Finance, both objected to the proposed exchange and to the tying of this exchange to the rectification treaty.
Bassols' basic objections to the proposal were four: Mexico
should never cede a portion of her territory, but simply exchange
territory; the compensation for territory should not be just an equal
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amount of surface territory, but rather territory which had as much
commercial value as Chamizal; the case of Chamizal' ought to be
handled separately from that of the Pious Fund; and any treaty
regarding boundaries ought to be divorced completely from the
treaty regarding rectification. 3s The objections of Pani were much
the same, but he added that it was unconstitutional to sell any
portion of Mexican territory. He also pointed out the dangers in
renouncing the private titles to land held by Mexican nationals. 39
In the meantime, Tellez, on August 17, 1932, had presented
three draft agreements to Clark. The first was a convention covering the rectification of the river; the second was a protocol regarding the transfer of Chamizal to the United States; and the third
was a protocol regarding the release by the United States of the
Pious Fund and its unpaid balance. 4o Clark submitted a counterdraft which combined Chamizal and the Pious Fund and Tellez
agreed to the change, stating that he would have to obtain the
approval of President Ortiz Rubio and General Calles before
submitting it to the entire cabinet. 41 Before Tellez could do so,
President Ortiz Rubio resigned on August 27 and General Abelardo 1. Rodriguez was elected President by the Mexican Senate
on September 3. 42
President Rodriguez designated Jose Manuel Puig Casauranc
as his Minister of Foreign Relations and called a cabinet meeting
to discuss the problems of river rectification and Chamizal. Some
members of the cabinet felt that Clark and the United States State
Department had political motives for negotiating a quick settlement in view of the fact that the United States presidential elections were to be held in November. 43 The cabinet also accepted,
for the most part, the objections of Pani and Bassols and felt that
such an agreement would violate Mexico's historical policy and
would completely alienate public opinion. 44
.
In January 1933 Puig Casauranc presented Clark with a redrafted convention covering Chamizal and a protocol regarding
the Pious Fund. The new Mexican proposal differed in -many
respects from the previous ones. It absolutely separated the three
points; it transferred more territory from the United States than
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she would receive; it allowed Mexico to retain private titles in
Chamizal and provided for an international commission to adjudicate them; it allowed for the signing of a rectification treaty, based
on Minute 129, omitting reference to Chamizal; and it implied
that the United States owed an apology to Mexico for the lengthy
.
litigation over ChamizaJ.45
The Mexican cabinet rightly viewed this proposal as an astut~
diplomatic move. It was a skillful countermove to offset the
United States play before the November elections, but Calles and
Rodriguez both desired to maintain cordial relations with the
United States. Thus Rodriguez worked to obtain a rectification
treaty quickly and to put off the Chamizal settlement untillater. 46
But the Mexican proposal was more than shrewd diplomacy; internal policy also made it advisable. Word had leaked out that
the Mexican Government was on the verge of ceding some land
to the United States and the ire of the Mexican people was up. To
have traded Chamizal for the Pious Fund would have spelled political disaster for the Rodriguez government. In fact, the rumors
had reached such proportions that on October 22, 1932, Rodriguez
was compelled to release the following statement to the press:
My Government will never close any treaty implying loss or modification of the integrity of the national territory, for my antecedents
as a revolutionary and as a Mexican and my attitude as President
would not allow me to do SO.47

It is clear that the Mexican proposal was not acceptable to either
Clark or the State Department, because the entire question of
Chamizal was 'left unsettled until July 1 963~ The most pressing
matter, a rectification treaty, however, was signed by Clark and
Puig Casauranc on February I, 1933. 48 The purpose of the treaty
was clearly set forth in its preamble:
The United States of America and the United Mexican States having taken into consideration the studies and engineering plans carried
on by the International Boundary Commission, and specially directed
to relieve the towns and agricultural lands located within the El PasoJuarez Valley from flood dangers, and securing at the same time the
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stabilization of the international boundary line, which, owing to the
present meandering nature of the river it has not been possible to
hold within the mean line of its channel; and fully conscious of the
great importance involved in this matter, both from a local point of
view as well as from a good international understanding, have resolved to undertake, in common agreement and cooperation, the
necessary works as provided in Minute 129 of the International Boundary Commission, approved by the two Governments in the manner
provided by treaty. . . .49

The. treaty closely followed the conditions set forth in Minute
129 except in one respect. Minute 129 had called for the exchange
of about 10,000 acres of land between the two countries beginning
at the western point of Chamizal or Land Monument Number
One and continuing to Box Canyon below Fort Quitman. The
Treaty of 1933, however, specified that work should begin at
Monument Fifteen on Cordoba Island, one mile east of Chamizal,5° Thus the entire problem of Chamizal was deleted from the
rectification treaty.
.The treaty met no opposition in the United States and the
Senate passed it on May I, 1933. 51 The Mexican Congress was not
in session when the treaty was signed and did not convene until
September I. In the interim, the Mexican landowners in the
Ciudad ]U<lrez Valley protested that the treaty would deprive them
of their water rights, and the danger that the treaty would fail in
the Mexican Senate appeared very real. 52 President Rodriguez,
however, favored it and it was ratified by the Mexican Senate, in
secret session on September 13, 1933. 53
a postscript, it should be noted that the project was a success.
The length of the river between El Paso and Fort Quitman was
straightened and shortened, and parallel levees approximately 590
feet apart were constructed. A total of 5,121 acres of land was cut
from the United States and an equal amount was cut from Mexico.
Over 17,000,000 cubic yards of earth were moved during the digging of the channel, which was completed in four years at a cost
of slightly over $6,000,000. 54
There can be little doubt that the treaty was a major step forward in the diplomatic history of the two countries. The United

As
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States had been the chief initiator in the negotiations since 19°°,
but the failure to include Cordoba and Chamizal must be viewed
as a diplomatic triumph for Mexico. Nevertheless, the United
States did derive important benefits from the treaty, for it lessened
the possibility of costly floods in the valley, enabled the United
States to enforce its laws better, and solved many disrupting disputes over territorial sovereignty. 55 Mexico's fear that the United
States would gain control of some Mexican territory prevented
the signing of any treaty until 1933, but she also derived many
benefits from the treaty. Not only had she won a diplomatic victory on the questions of Chamizal and Cordoba, but protected
her half of the valley from destructive floods. 56
It is doubtful whether the treaty would have been as easily obtained if it had not been for the work of the Boundary Commission. The Commission was and is a unique institution. It is not an
arbitral commission in the true sense of the word, but it does render
decisions and these decisions are rarely disapproved by the two
governments. In addition, the work of the Commission has always
been relatively successful even during those periods of turmoil
which have marred the relations of the two countries. Thus much
of the credit for any boundary settlements, including the Treaty
of 1933, must go to the Commission. 57 .
The Treaty of 1933 was good evidence of a new diplomatic
climate between the United States and Mexico. Both countrie~
peaceably agreed to alter their common boundary and to exchange
territory. Such ~n agreement would hardly have been possible in
the period 1910-1930. Despite its historical antecedents, the boundary dispute became involved in the conflicts which arose between
Mexico and the United States during the Mexican Revolution.
Mexican fear of Yankee imperialism had to be dispelled, as did the
United States' fear that Mexico would not fulfill her obligations.
The final adjustment of the boundary was a credit to the diplomatic
efforts of Ambassadors Morrow and Clark, and particularly to the
growing realization on the part of both governments that issues
could be settled only through peaceful negotiation and compromise.
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Nevertheless, although the Chamizal problem was almost solved
in 1932, the new climate of negotiation and compromise had not
yet reached the point where a final settlement could be made.
Ambassador Daniels continued to press the matter, but he was far
more concerned with the urgent problems of the claims commissions and the oil expropriation of 1938. Throughout the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations Chamizal remained a point of
contention.
In 196 I President John F. Kennedy initiated proceedings which
culminated in the Treaty of 1963. This treaty transferred to Mexico a net amount of 437 acres of United States territory, including
366 acres from the Chamizal zone and 7 I acres from an area east
of Cordoba Island. In addition, Cordoba Island was divided equally
between both nations. The irony of this settlement is that it almost
exactly followed the arbitral award of 191 I.
It is difficult for citizens of the United States to understand the
deep emotion and nationalism which Mexicans felt and feel on
the question of Chamizal. It had become a symbol of Mexican
resistance to United States encroachment, and the 1963 settlement
contributed immeasurably to the betterment of relations between
the two nations. In retrospect, it seems unfortunate and a bit
absurd that the entire question was not settled in 1932, along the
same lines as the 1963 decision. The thirty-year delay served no
useful purpose, but only intensified a sense of frustration. Such
are the foibles of international diplomacy.

NOTES
. L
It is not the purpose of this paper to rehash all the old boundary
disputes, or to discuss in detail the changing character of the Rio Grande,
but to place in perspective the treaty negotiations of 1930-1933 and to
demonstrate their importance in the final settlement of the boundary.
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in the aforesaid treaty and follow the center of the normal channel of
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course of those rivers, provided that such alterations be effected by natural
causes through the slow and gradual erosion and deposit of alluvium and
not by the abandonment of an existing river bed and the opening of a new
one." Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Con~icts in Central
and North America and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 303.
3. Gladys Gregory, "TheChamizal Settlement, A View From £1
Paso," Southwestern Studies, vol. I (1963), pp. 14-15.
4. Bancos were tracts of land transplanted from one country to the
other when the Rio Grande shifted its bed. The existence of these severely
impeded rectification negotiations.
5.· For examples of correspondence on the banco problem, see Foreign
Relations, 1929, vol 3, pp. 473-79.
6. James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), p. 621.
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26. Ibid.
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